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Abstract
Social defeat is a psychiatric theory accounting for the role of social environment in the aetiology 
of psychosis via the mechanism of stress. Social defeat stems from animal studies of stress, 
whereby a small rat is introduced into a larger rat’s cage and is subsequently attacked and 
defeated by its larger foe. The defeated rat is subjected to behavioural and hormonal analyses 
to explore its stress levels. The idea is that social defeat leads to social stress which may cause 
psychoses. In this article, we draw on the work of Jean-Paul Selten to critique the epistemics that 
are bound up with social defeat research. For comparative analysis, we use Mead’s Mind, Self and 
Society to tease out the problems of social defeat and suggest potential remedies. We contend 
that, in seeking to equate animal and human sociality, social defeat portrays human interaction as 
hostile and pathological, and minority groups as inevitably defeated. In contrast, Mead’s symbolic 
interaction presents human sociality as progressively organizational. Mead’s account is grounded 
in human exceptionalism and lacking attention to structural inequalities. Nevertheless, symbolic 
interaction has much to offer contemporary social defeat research, albeit whilst echoing some 
of its thin sociology.
Keywords
biosocial, city, Mead, migration, psychosis, rodent model, Selten, social defeat, symbolic 
interaction, schizophrenia, urban
Corresponding author:
James Rupert Fletcher, Department of Global Health and Social Medicine, King’s College London, Room 
3.12, Bush House North East Wing, 30, Aldwych, London, WC2B 4BG, UK. 
Email: james.fletcher@kcl.ac.uk
902997 SOR0010.1177/0038026120902997The Sociological ReviewFletcher and Birk
research-article2020
Article
1274 The Sociological Review 68(6)
Introduction
In this article, we contribute to contemporary literatures on the biosocial by analysing 
‘social defeat’, an influential theory in psychiatric research linking social environment 
and schizophrenia. We suggest that another biosocial account of the mind, Mead’s (1934) 
outline of symbolic interaction in Mind, Self and Society, offers a productive comparator. 
While this comparison may seem idiosyncratic, both use fighting animals to develop 
implicit imaginings of human sociality and its psychological consequences that can be 
considered thinly sociological. Reading social defeat alongside Mead reveals radically 
different imaginings of the biosocial. This comparison exemplifies the opportunities for 
sociology to contribute to and learn from biosocial research into pressing social prob-
lems, responding to Newton’s (2016, p. 130) call for ‘reflexive, and in-depth, interroga-
tion of existing social and life science assumption [sic]’.
In recent decades, psychiatric thought has shifted toward traditional sociological con-
cerns. Where mental disorders were once deemed primarily biological and brain-based, 
the social environment is now attributed a greater role in the aetiology of various mental 
illnesses (Fitzgerald et al., 2016). This matters for sociology because the rise of the social 
environment as an aetiological variable is progressing with promise that can be better 
realized through sociological engagement (Callard & Fitzgerald, 2015). This shift is ech-
oed in the biosocial turn in the social sciences, whereby the entanglement of the biologi-
cal and the social is being revitalized by findings from epigenetics and related fields 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2016; Landecker & Panofsky, 2013; Meloni & Testa, 2014). Indeed, 
Rose (2013) suggests that sociology’s future relies on engagement with biology, while 
Timmermans and Haas (2008) have argued for a more physiology-embracing sociology 
of disease. To this end, Niewöhner (2011) has offered a notion of ‘customary biology’, 
grounded in observed regularities rather than laws, understanding biologies alongside 
habituated forms of everyday life.
Sociological interest in the biological has a substantial history (Meloni et al., 2016). 
In the early 20th century there was a rich engagement between sociological and psychi-
atric concerns, e.g. Faris and Dunham’s (1939) work on mental disorders in urban areas. 
They argued that cities – and the modes of social organization within them – could lead 
to the development of mental disorders (Fitzgerald et al., 2016). Thus, the relationship 
between cities and mental illness was a ‘foundational concern for sociology’, at a time 
when the borders between sociology and psychiatry were less solidified than they would 
be for much of the 20th century (Fitzgerald et al., 2016, p. 140). For Fitzgerald, Rose and 
Singh, sociologists must pay more attention to people’s embodied and biologic lives and 
the equally real historical, political and scientific attempts to understand, chart, and gov-
ern those lives as ‘matters of concern’ (Latour, 2004).
In this article, we contribute to the biosocial turn through analysing ‘social defeat’ as 
an influential way of conceptualizing, operationalizing and researching the biosocial gen-
esis of mental illness. We focus on the notion of social defeat because, since its introduc-
tion in an editorial in 2005 (Selten & Cantor-Graae, 2005), it has become a popular means 
of accounting for relationships between urbanicity, ethnicity and psychoses in the psychi-
atric research literature. Social defeat is often used as a starting point for unifying various 
‘exposures’ that correlate with risk of psychosis (e.g. Gevonden et al., 2014a, 2014b; van 
Fletcher and Birk 1275
Dam et al., 2012; Veling et al., 2007). Social defeat is also entering the social sciences. For 
example, Marrow and Luhrmann (2016, p. 197) have used social defeat to explain ‘the 
way that poverty, violence, and being on the wrong side of power drive us mad’. Social 
defeat’s purchase in biosocial psychiatry and penetration into social science warrants 
sociological analysis of the concept, and the imaginings of social life it generates.
In this article, we pursue said analysis by focusing on the foundational work of Jean-
Paul Selten, a key figure in developing the social defeat hypothesis. A professor of psy-
chiatry focusing on the epidemiology of schizophrenia, he is credited with the first 
attempt to develop a causative mechanism to explain various social environmental asso-
ciations with schizophrenia (Selten et al., 2017). Our analysis is based on a critical read-
ing of all of Selten’s publications focusing on ‘social defeat’. The substantive analysis 
we present here is especially focused upon the first two publications by Selten and col-
laborator, Cantor-Graae (Cantor-Graae & Selten, 2005; Selten & Cantor-Graae, 2005), 
cited around 1700 times, which make their hypothesis about social defeat explicit, as 
well as subsequent publications developing the hypothesis (e.g. Selten et al., 2013, 2016, 
2017). We also conducted limited ‘snowball sampling’, critically reading numerous 
papers that apply Selten’s work on social defeat in various settings. This is not a formal 
literature review, nor do we purport to have read the exorbitant number of papers citing 
social defeat, nor do we suggest that social defeat is the only theory of the social cur-
rently inhabiting psychiatric research.
We focus on Selten’s work as a coherent, accessible and indicative means of interro-
gating conceptual issues that are evident in the broader tradition of social defeat (see 
Cantor-Graae & Selten, 2005; Selten & Cantor-Graae, 2005; Selten et al., 2013, 2019). 
Selten’s work is also an example of the kinds of syntheses of traditional sociological and 
biological concerns to which we speak, entangling biology and society to theorize human 
experience. Social defeat, we argue, is a form of ‘thin sociology’ – a sociological engage-
ment at a superficial level. However, we will show that this very ‘thinness’ creates space 
for epistemological ‘entanglements’ and collaborations (Callard & Fitzgerald, 2015) 
because it imagines the social alongside the biological.
Rats and social defeat
Social defeat research has a long history, emerging from the broader 20th century tradi-
tion of using rats to model human behaviour (Ramsden, 2012). This is most commonly 
done with the resident–intruder paradigm (Björkqvist, 2001), where a smaller ‘intruder’ 
rat is put into the cage of a larger ‘resident’ rat.1 In the optimal version of these experi-
ments (see Koolhaas et al., 2013), a resident male rat is housed with a female companion 
to encourage it to establish a territory that it will defend. After several days, the female is 
removed from the cage and the intruder is introduced. The resident and intruder rats are 
then observed interacting for 10 minutes, during which a range of distinct behaviours are 
typically observed, e.g. the ‘clinch attack’ – where the resident mounts, bites and 
scratches the intruder. The actions of the fighting rats are typified into component behav-
iours, operationalization of sociality in terms of type, frequency and duration of behav-
iour. Social defeat refers to how these interactions result in one rat losing and the other 
winning, that is, asserting its dominance (Koolhaas et al., 2013).
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While behavioural analyses are an important component of social defeat research, 
the tradition has historically been dominated by physiological analyses (Björkqvist, 
2001). Throughout the 1990s, publications charted myriad molecular changes associ-
ated with social defeat in rats. When compared with control rats, socially defeated rats 
were shown to have impaired corticosterone response (Albeck et al.,1997), neurological 
development (Alleva & Aloe, 1989), dopaminergic response (Tidey & Miczek, 1997) 
and immunological function (Stefanski & Engler, 1999). Social defeat was also pro-
posed as an animal model for mental disorders such as depression (Koolhaas et al., 
1995). Behavioural changes in defeated rats were posited to be depression-like, resem-
bling those in humans. While social defeat is still employed as an animal model for 
mental disorders (see Koolhaas et al., 1995 for critical discussion), the work by Selten 
and Cantor-Graae takes a different but important approach. They see social defeat not 
just as a way of modelling schizophrenia, but as being potentially implicated in the 
mechanisms of schizophrenia’s onset.
In 2004, Selten and Cantor-Graae published a book chapter about schizophrenia and 
migration in which they hypothesized social defeat as an explanatory mechanism, fol-
lowed by two influential papers in 2005: the previously mentioned editorial, and a review 
of the relations between schizophrenia and migration. The editorial begins by showing 
that schizophrenia is associated with urban upbringing, migration and low IQ. Selten and 
Cantor-Graae (2005, p. 101) suggest that these findings can be explained through social 
defeat because city life exposes them to social competition and potential ‘outsider sta-
tus’. Long-term social defeat, also termed ‘subordinate position’ or ‘outsider status’ (we 
return to this terminology below) is hypothesized as a bridging concept for explaining 
the association between being a migrant or a city-dweller (or both) and having an 
increased risk of developing schizophrenia. In short, their hypothesis is that ‘a chronic 
and long-term experience of social defeat may lead to sensitisation of the mesolimbic 
dopamine system (and/or to increased baseline activity of this system) and thereby 
increase the risk of schizophrenia’ (2005, p. 101).
Beginning with epidemiological studies showing increased schizophrenia risk for 
second-generation migrants and city-dwellers, social defeat is an attempt to formulate a 
mechanism for understanding the strong correlations between particular forms of life (in 
the city, as a migrant) and schizophrenia. Having initially noted that the mesolimbic 
dopamine system is sensitized in schizophrenia (2005, p. 102), Selten and Cantor-Graae 
argue that social defeat in rats has been shown to produce ‘dopaminergic hyperactivity in 
the meso-corticolimbic system’. For them, this similarity is telling: ‘If the results of ani-
mal experiments can be extended to humans, chronic exposure to social defeat may lead 
to sensitisation of the mesolimbic dopamine system and/or overactivity of this system, 
and thus further the development of psychosis’ (2005, p. 102).
In their meta-review, published at the same time, Cantor-Graae and Selten (2005, p. 
17) find ‘a significant association of risk [for schizophrenia] with skin color. . . . The 
mean weighted relative risk for migrants from countries where the majority of the popu-
lation was black was 4.8 (95% CI= 3.7-6.2), approximately two times greater than that 
for migrants from countries where the majority was white or nonwhite/nonblack.’ They 
note that social defeat might explain these findings, because ‘social defeat could arise 
whenever an individual is forced into a subordinate position in relation to a dominant 
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group’ (Cantor-Graae & Selten, 2005, p. 21). The payoff of this supposition is that ‘dis-
turbed brain dopaminergic function resulting from long-term experiences of social defeat 
could provide a common pathogenetic mechanism for the increased risk for schizophre-
nia in urban residents and migrants’ (Cantor-Graae & Selten, 2005, p. 21).
Selten’s research has focused mainly on ethnicity (often operationalized in terms of 
‘lighter’ or ‘darker’ skin colour, see e.g. Cantor-Graae & Selten, 2005, p. 21), migration 
and schizophrenia in urban areas. However, Selten has, with his colleagues, also extended 
social defeat to other phenomena: discrimination (Veling et al., 2007), childhood bully-
ing (van Dam et al., 2012), sexual minority status (Gevonden et al., 2014b) and hearing 
impairment (Gevonden et al., 2014a). This expansion of the scope of social defeat as an 
explanation of human experience is repeatedly justified with reference to the original 
paper (Selten & Cantor-Graae, 2005). This use as a base reference is echoed in the wider 
literature. Selten’s work is highly cited, but these citations often acknowledge the social 
defeat hypothesis briefly, without critical engagement (e.g. Lederbogen et al., 2011; 
McGrath et al., 2008; van Os et al., 2010). The intricacies of rat experiments are largely 
absent in such accounts. Social defeat has thus subtly proliferated in publications, while 
also remaining unnoticed.
Drawing on a long tradition of experiments with fighting rats, Selten and his col-
leagues have devised a single proxy for various social behaviours, environments, and 
relations, a proxy that can be tested and physiologically measured, and used to explain 
how particular mental disorders develop. This approach moves between ‘models of’ and 
‘models for’ (Geertz, 1973). The former manipulates symbolic systems to imitate exist-
ing non-symbolic systems (e.g. manipulating rats to mimic humans), while the latter 
manipulates existing non-symbolic systems based on symbolic systems (e.g. understand-
ing humans based on observations of rats). In the following we will expand on the impli-
cations this transition has for research.
Selten’s biosocial account of human psychoses through the prism of fighting animals 
led us to wonder how else animal sociality might be used to provide insights regarding 
human sociality and its relationship with the mind. Selten’s use of fighting animals to 
create this account of the human psyche as constituted within sociality has a peculiar 
predecessor in Mead. Like Selten, Mead draws on fighting animals as a basis for hypoth-
esizing the biosocial genesis of human mental states, but Mead proposes a more organi-
zational sociality. While we are aware that these are highly different examples, what we 
attempt through this comparison is less a corrective to Selten – Mead is not the protago-
nist of this article, nor is Selten the antagonist – and more an experiment in extending a 
wider epistemological space for imagining human sociality vis-a-vis animal behaviour 
and the mind. This comparison is salient for biosocial research and sociology because it 
offers new opportunities to contribute to and learn from alternative responses to social 
problems.
Dogs and symbolic interaction
For Mead (1934), symbolic interaction (SI) begins with organisms living in groups, inev-
itably entailing interaction. Interaction, here, is a dance of gestures – one actor performs 
a gesture and another perceives it. Mead (1934, p. 14) provides the example of fighting 
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dogs. The arrangements of the dogs’ facial muscles reveal the aggressive intentions of 
each toward its rival. In response to its rival’s gesture, each dog rearranges its facial 
muscles, creating a new gesture. Mead ascribes no intentionality to an animal’s expres-
sion of a meaning to another animal. The facial muscles of a dog preparing to attack 
adopt a certain formation instinctively, without the dog intending to transmit a signal. 
The gesture transmits a signal because it elicits a comparable physiological response in 
the other dog. Over time, a conversation of gestures can emerge, each dog responding to 
the other. ‘The act of each dog becomes the stimulus to the other dog for his response. 
There is then a relationship between these two. . . . We have here a conversation of ges-
tures’ (Mead, 1934, pp. 42–43).
From this account, Mead delineates an analogous process through which the con-
scious human mind develops. He distinguishes between the conscious (significant) ges-
tures of humans and the unconscious (non-significant) gestures of non-human animals 
(1934, p. 81). This distinction is culturally embedded in wider symbolic systems, 
whereby a conscious gesture is informed by and manifests rich multi-layered meanings 
beyond the act itself. Symbolism works because multiple individuals attribute a symbol 
to some specific thing that differs from the symbol (Mead, 1934). This conversation of 
significant gestures is symbolic interaction. Mead believed that only humans use signifi-
cant symbols, because they are singularly endowed with sufficient neurological and 
vocal physiology. Vocal communication is critical because the originator’s experience of 
it is closely akin to the recipient’s experience. While one rarely views one’s own facial 
expressions when interacting, one does usually hear one’s own words. Vocal communi-
cation hence aligns the perspectives of speaker and listener (Mead, 1934, p. 65).
Once able to envisage the situation of the other, one is then able to appreciate the 
probable response of the other. The internalization of the disposition of the other is 
organized into an idea of the generalized other – a broad representation of all others 
within a community. Mead argues that the external conversation of significant gestures 
is internalized, producing an internal conversation with the generalized other: ‘mind’. 
The mind’s conversation is ‘the general mechanism of what we term “thought”’ (Mead, 
1934, p. 73). The presence of thought distinguishes symbolic and non-symbolic interac-
tion. Critically, the mind does not arise neurologically through intrinsic developmental 
processes before reaching a stage at which it gives rise to social beings. Instead, physi-
ological preconditions facilitate social processes that eventually constitute the mind and 
its social components.
From fighting dogs, Mead extrapolates a biosocial process through which complex 
phenomena such as consciousness and society emerge. Despite ending with such ethereal 
concepts, the entire narrative rests upon socio-physiological interactions between fight-
ing animals. Mead suggests that organisms with basic physiological characteristics, 
given sufficient proximity, will eventually give rise to complex biosocial processes of 
mind, and ultimately human mental experience.
Thin sociology
The use of animal models in various sciences is commonplace, as is criticism hereof, 
especially within psychiatric research. It is not our intention to regurgitate these 
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discussions (e.g. Nelson, 2018; Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013). Likewise, while both Selten 
and Mead could be critiqued for their failure to engage with more-than-human sociality 
and animals as companion species (Haraway, 2008; Kirksey & Helmreich, 2010), such 
critique is beyond our scope. We are interested in the ways knowledge claims are pro-
posed, assessed and substantiated in Mead and Selten’s works – specifically how they 
employ animal hostility to explicate human sociality in relation to mental states. To pref-
ace our point, Mead and Selten both derive particular understandings from animals 
which, either in the laboratory or the thought-experiment, fight. The fighting animal is 
the starting point of their ideas, and elucidating these understandings is useful in analys-
ing how they conceptualize sociality and, crucially, what potential forms of sociality 
academics might imagine within biosocial accounts. In this section, we will consider 
how Mead and Selten differ in the ways they use animals to understand humans, the 
former casting sociality as organizational, the latter as pathological.
The prescriptions of sociality that we draw out here are implicit in the authors’ differ-
ent analytical aims – social processes for Mead and environment–psychoses associations 
for Selten. Despite this implicitness, their specific imaginings of sociality are founda-
tional to both accounts. They are also both expansive. Mead sought to explain human 
society: an evidently grand sociological project. Selten differs somewhat. He began with 
the specific link between migration and schizophrenia, before broadening his scope to 
bring different groups under the social defeat umbrella. Today, the hypothesis encom-
passes varied social inequalities, applying a consistent imagining of sociality based on 
the experience of being defeated.
Central to Mead and Selten’s particular forms of knowledge about human life is the 
intriguing starting point that they share: the fighting animal. For Selten, the notion of the 
fight is entangled with a view of the urban environment as a ‘highly competitive atmos-
phere’ (Cantor-Graae & Selten, 2005, p. 21). The unequal fight between a binary of large 
rat and small rat comes to echo the unequal relations of certain (reductive) binaries of 
people – black or white, able-bodied and disabled. Selten’s work focuses almost entirely 
on the symbol of the defeated rat, because it is from this rat that he draws comparisons 
with types of humans. We learn little of the victor.
What is noteworthy here is that these fights are rigged absolutely. In optimal experi-
ments, intruder rats weigh less than residents, and are from less aggressive strains 
(Koolhaas et al., 2013). This approach entails rather grim imaginings of sociality. In the 
urban setting, there is conflict and a minority group-member is defeated. The truth of 
conflict and defeat is envisaged before the experiment begins, and the experiment is set 
up to re-enact and capture the pathological realities of this miserable sociality. Of course, 
most people accept that human interactions are often similarly rigged in unequal socie-
ties, with advantaged groups profiting at the expense of the disadvantaged. However, 
Selten’s invocation of this rigged-ness is direct and absolute to an extent that seems dif-
ficult to reconcile with understandings of social inequality and structural violence.
Selten’s use of fighting rats to represent city-dwelling humans implies that those 
humans – especially ‘dark-skinned migrants’, those with hearing impairments and mem-
bers of sexual minorities – somehow resemble the socially defeated intruder rat. In doing 
so, Selten populates certain situations, conceptualized in terms of social defeat, with 
certain stereotypes, particularly those relating to black migrants. Of course, Selten’s 
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comparison only extends so far – he does not suggest that members of human groups are 
subject to ‘clinch attacks’, and he often switches defeat for ‘social exclusion’ or ‘out-
sider-position’ (Selten et al., 2013, p. 1180). Despite the use of these phrases, outlines of 
social defeat provided in the literature typically seem more applicable to animal fights 
than the experiences of, for instance, a bullied child.
This problem is attributable to Selten’s work resting upon the assumption that 
because the downstream molecular effects of fighting in rats and exclusion in humans 
are comparable, the initiating social phenomena must also be somehow aligned. This 
represents a specific assumptive problem because biologic parity does not necessitate 
social parity. A problem emerges as the initiating social component of the biosocial 
account (e.g. clinch attacks) comprises behaviours that are (mostly) alien to human 
experience. Translating the peculiarities of rat aggression into a sociological theory is 
a major conceptual challenge. The social connotations of biologic similarities are 
forced into an unconvincing alignment to correspond with molecular observations. 
There is hence a risk, familiar to medical sociologists, that human behaviour is reduced 
to biology (Meloni et al., 2016). There are parallels here with sociobiology and criti-
cisms thereof (see Alcock, 2001).
The problem leads to subsequent attempts to flesh out social defeat’s biology-centred 
sociality. In practice, Selten and colleagues (2013) have used Gilbert and Allen’s (1998) 
‘defeat scale’ to measure defeat. The scale uses self-report indicators such as: ‘I feel that 
I have not made it in life’ and ‘I feel that I am one of life’s losers’. This particular opera-
tionalization further muddles the picture, forwarding multiple ideas of the forms of soci-
ality which ostensibly cause mental disorders. We have the notions of defeat, outsider 
position, exclusion, and feeling like a loser. These ideas are used interchangeably and 
lack grounding in a coherent conceptualization of sociality. They are a form of what we 
call ‘thin sociology’. We use this term to invoke the opposite of ‘thick description’. 
Briefly, ‘thick description’ indicates a wide and nuanced description of social situations, 
one that considers the varied interpretations and activities of the actor. As the classic 
example goes, a thin account cannot distinguish between a blink and a wink, seeing both 
as contractions of the eye lid (Geertz, 1973). Thin description is not wrong – just thin. 
The thinness of social defeat is problematic, as it casts the urban environment purely as 
an amalgamation of negative buzzwords relating to the racial discrimination that is 
assumed to constrain their mental health. This thin sociology creates several sociological 
problems.
Pathological or organizational sociality
A social defeat notion of sociality neglects inequality, often posited as central to under-
standing health disparities (e.g. Allen et al., 2014; Wicks et al., 2005), instead preferring 
the imagery of a one-on-one fight, a winner and a loser. Sociological literatures have for 
decades offered a variety of concepts (e.g. ‘habitus’, Bourdieu, 1977) to help us under-
stand how inequality and poverty do not simply arise from interactions, but are intracta-
bly present within and perpetuated through these interactions. This neglect is interesting, 
because the intruder-experiment relies on in-built inequalities, as the rats are paired to 
mismatch each other in terms of weight and aggression. It is also notable that the 
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experiment is conducted with fighting males and companion females, but that the impli-
cations of this gendering are never discussed.
The hypothesis of social defeat seemingly offers a way of thinking about inequalities, 
but Selten and his colleagues instead prioritize a sociological reading of these experi-
ments centring on fighting and losing. This curious sociological reading of resident–
intruder experiments, and subsequent application to humans, denotes a specific imagining 
of sociality as combative and pathological. This emphasis can be traced to mid-20th 
century ecological research regarding violence in densely populated rat colonies. Several 
disciplines (e.g. sociology and psychiatry) have drawn on these studies to cast human 
cities as analogously dystopic and violent (Ramsden, 2009). Social defeat’s presentation 
of pathological sociality must also be interpreted within a research economy that typi-
cally prefers work on pathogenic phenomena, e.g. stress, over salutogenic considera-
tions, e.g. resilience. The peculiarities of these claims implicate specific underlying 
conceptualizations of sociality. We are not suggesting that such research is naïve to rel-
evant social concerns, but rather that it is pragmatic reductionism, whereby broader fac-
tors such as health inequalities are condensed to facilitate complex research that would 
otherwise be impractical (Niewöhner & Lock, 2018).
In contrast, Mead’s approach has the opposite problem. It attributes undue romanti-
cism to lives lived within urban environments. Mead sees conflict as temporary, and the 
endpoint of symbolic interaction as ‘a universal society that includes the whole human 
race’ (Mead, 1934, p. 282). For Mead, individuals enjoy a reasonable equality of social 
opportunity because of their broadly universal physiological characteristics, especially 
regarding neurological and vocal hardware. Human equality is hence biological, and 
subsequent inequality incidental.
Mead’s appeals to ‘universal society’ and ‘the whole human race’ provide a counter-
point to Selten’s ascription of defeat to minority groups. However, such appeals lack 
appreciation of any kind of structural inequalities, theories of power, discourse, and most 
other major sociological concepts outside of the interactionist tradition. Importantly, 
they lack an appreciation of discrimination and racism. Mead sees few meaningful social 
differentiations in society, believing that those which do exist will eventually dissipate. 
The result is an imagining of society that struggles to grasp conflict and inequality, and 
so renders such considerations invisible. Conflict is barely noted in any form, be it situ-
ational or institutional. Mead therefore offers another type of thin sociology, devoid of 
richer sociological concepts that characterize the discipline.2 This renders it an especially 
useful comparator for Selten’s social defeat, as both share a narrowness that is not as 
present in many other sociologies. Social defeat has more in common with Mead’s sym-
bolic interaction than it does with many other sociologies.
However, Mead’s epistemic approach to sociality is a useful means of reflecting on 
social defeat. Mead opens up a wider space for understanding agency, something which 
is found wanting in social defeat. The symbolic interactor always has the potential to be 
defeated, to be victorious, or to be something else entirely – a potential that is not shared 
by the epidemiological subjects of social defeat.
Let us illustrate this point with an example from a recent social defeat study, co-
authored by Selten (Gevonden et al., 2016). The researchers explored reactivity to ‘social 
stress’, hypothesizing that repeated exposure to stressors, such as discrimination, leads to 
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greater reactivity to ‘social stress’. Comparing ‘Moroccan-Dutch’ to ‘Dutch men’, expe-
riences of social defeat were measured via a questionnaire, but no differences between 
the groups were found, undermining the hypothesis. In response, the authors contend that 
it ‘is unlikely that the Moroccan-Dutch participants did not feel to some extent excluded, 
because their position in Dutch society is extremely vulnerable’ (Gevonden et al., 2016, 
p. 634). Here, the notion of social defeat precludes an openness to what it means to be 
Moroccan-Dutch in the Netherlands and how those men’s experiences might shape their 
forms of life. Thinking social defeat ‘diffractively’ (Barad, 2014) through Mead thus 
highlights specific imaginings of agency within social constraints. In social defeat, the 
rats are impelled to fight, and the result of that fight is essentially predetermined. Mead’s 
dogs need not necessarily fight, and the outcome of any conflict is not certain, being 
dependent on the idiosyncrasies of a complex and unique interaction. While Selten’s 
sociality is always combative and pathological, Mead’s has the potential to be so, along-
side various other potentials.
The overarching problem with both Selten and Mead is a shared simplification and 
excessiveness, whereby blanket concepts of organization or defeat are applied univer-
sally. There are parallels here with Scott’s (1998) ‘thin simplification’, whereby efforts 
to impose simplistic logics on real-life diversities beget deleterious consequences. 
Multiple aspects of human sociality are overlooked. While reliable rat behaviours and 
outcomes correspond with fixed epidemiological imaginings of human behaviours and 
outcomes, they are less applicable to the experiences of individual people. The theoriz-
ing done around social defeat only works for the epidemiological subject, and not for 
living, breathing humans. Social defeat is a static category that does not allow for the 
processual, evolving, human elements of sociality – as symbolic interaction does – 
instead presenting us only with a fixed notion of a defeat. Mead’s symbolic interaction 
goes too far in its neglect of social structure and associated conflict, at worst ignoring 
inequality. However, its focus on the processual character of human interaction might 
provide a more informative notion of the forms of sociality that are implicated in the 
onset of mental disorders. We do not wish to abolish or supplant Selten’s approach. It is 
a laudable attempt to substitute a correlational black-box with a causative mechanism. Its 
explicit attempts to work in the interstices between sociality and biology, and to bridge 
them, are filled with potentials. We highlight pertinent aspects of Mead’s work and its 
implications for social defeat as a means of contributing to this effort.
Mead’s idealism provides a valuable counterbalance to the unequivocal negativity of 
social defeat. It stimulates questions regarding the conceptual parameters of social defeat 
and whether sociology might be able to contribute to a deepening of its focus. What 
might we learn from subjecting the victorious rat to the empirical and intellectual scru-
tiny that has so far been reserved for the loser? What might we learn from modelling 
interactions that are less outrightly predetermined and evolve more naturalistically? 
Another traditional sociological lesson that might be taken from Mead and applied to 
social defeat is the sustained importance of relationships, potentially informing more 
‘ecologically valid’ and therefore naturalistic experiments. Embracing sustained rela-
tionality could contribute to Niewöhner’s (2011) concept of ‘customary biology’, situat-
ing molecular processes exist within habitualized lives, of which relationships are a 
central feature. For Selten, the social interaction of the fight begets a biologic process 
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that is subsequently limited to and measured within an individual. In contrast, Mead’s 
biosocial process is continually socially constituted. Recognizing this protracted rela-
tionality, social defeat might benefit from the repeated monitoring of rats as they interact 
over a substantial timeframe (see Koolhaas et al., 1995 on temporality in rat-based stress 
research). Such observation could dissolve binary approaches to pathological and organ-
izational sociality, potentially revealing more complex biosocial processes.
Embracing differences and similarities
Another interesting comparison between Selten and Mead is that they differ entirely in 
their ideas of animal–human comparability. Mead strictly distinguishes humans from 
other animals by virtue of their neurological and vocal physiology, and by extension 
their exclusive access to symbolism. This symbolism distinguishes the ‘biologic indi-
vidual’ from the ‘socially self-conscious individual’ (Mead, 1934, p. 347). Mead’s 
appeal to the uniqueness of humans can appear unduly zealous considering contempo-
rary understandings of symbolic communication in other species (Irvine, 2003). It is 
also this assertion of humans’ unique consciousness that partly alienated Mead from 
behaviourist thought (Cook, 1977). Those who extend rat models of social defeat to 
conceptualize human experience often appear to work in the opposite direction, moving 
from rats to people in a manner that minimizes differences (Manning, 2019). Selten thus 
uses observations of the sensitization of the mesolimbic dopamine system to establish 
biosocial parity between rat and human. As with their aforementioned ideas of the qual-
ities of interactions, both scholars inhabit opposite extremes regarding the sameness/
differentness of animals and humans.
In contrast with Selten’s view of sociality as conflictual, Mead views interaction as an 
organizing process through which conflict is diminished. Over time, meanings are shared 
among actors and their shared social action becomes more cohesive. Symbolic interac-
tion is hence a sort of social force impelling groups away from conflict and toward coop-
erative coexistence. To this end, he emulates Plato and Aristoteles’ veneration of the 
city-state as the ideal form of social organization (Mead, 1934, p. 266), encouraging 
rationality, self-governance and good neighbourliness. This is an interesting divergence. 
While Selten identifies the city as an especially hostile environment, Mead singles it out 
as especially cohesive. These opposed characterizations of urban life are both grounded 
in animal comparisons, with Selten emphasizing similarities and Mead differences. 
Animal-based analogies for Mead’s imagined city could easily be found (e.g. beehives) 
so it is notable that he focuses on differences, particularly given the similarity-focus in 
much contemporary biosocial animal modelling.
Mead presents the warring biologic individual and the cooperative socially self-con-
scious individual as opposite ends of the interactionist process, transitioning from con-
flict to cooperation. Fighting animals are employed to evidence the precursor and 
antithesis of human coexistence. While Selten draws on work equating the violently 
competitive rat colony with the human city (Ramsden, 2012), Mead presents a semi-
Darwinist/semi-functionalist world-view in which large-scale human societies represent 
the utmost cohesion, in contrast to fighting animals. Despite similar beginnings (fighting 
animals), mediums (biosociality) and ends (human mental states), the two scholars 
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diverge in how they enact their comparisons. Selten turns to fighting rats to show us what 
we are; Mead gives us fighting dogs to show us what we are not. It is important to appre-
ciate this divergence of thought because it reveals that appeals to animal conflict as some 
sort of touchstone for understanding humans can be developed in opposite directions.
That the two scholars use fighting animals in such different ways poses important 
questions regarding the utility of drawing similarities and differences in comparative 
theorizing. Selten seems to be invested in emphasizing animal–human similarities to 
establish an empirical basis for social defeat. This approach appears somewhat intuitive 
– a model should resemble that which it models. However, Mead’s use of fighting dogs 
reveals that the extrapolation of similarity is not necessary to an account of humans 
based on animal behaviour. He develops a theory of mind in reference to animal–human 
dissimilarities. This approach to fighting animals has important implications for social 
defeat. What would happen if rat models of stress were used to explore dissimilarities 
with human sociality and mental health? Might the dissimilarities between the physical 
violence of fighting rats compared with the symbolic violence of competing humans, or 
the one-on-one hostility in the resident–intruder experiments compared with the group-
level tensions in human societies, teach us something about biosocial mechanisms of 
mental illness? These questions emulate longstanding anthropological concerns regard-
ing similarities and differences, universalism and relativism (Brown, 1991). As such, 
similarities and differences are another area in which sociology may be able to make 
significant conceptual contributions to biosocial research.
The emphasizing of similarities between animal and human sociality is a problem in 
social defeat because it is a by-product rather than a key component. This is evident in 
the strange way in which Selten looks to fighting rats to operationalize human social 
processes that he portrays as being commonplace in society. Such portrayals imply that 
investigating the social defeat of certain populations should be relatively easy – one 
could simply observe people interacting within any multi-ethnic urban location. However, 
this is not the case. If one were to observe a native and a migrant sitting side-by-side on 
a bus, it is unlikely that they would interact at all, let alone resort to clinch attacks (this 
is before one enters into questions of what ‘native’ and ‘migrant’ means). Of course, such 
seemingly innocuous interactions may manifest powerful instances of structural violence 
(see Charlesworth et al., 2004), but likewise, they may not. This tension reveals that 
Selten’s use of rats to represent human social phenomena is a by-product of the use of 
rats to represent associated human biological phenomena, because that biology is much 
more difficult to study in humans. As such, the uniting of separate traditions within 
biosocial research unwittingly imposes the practical difficulties of molecular research in 
human subjects onto social research that need not be subject to the same constraints. 
Selten’s efforts to establish a biological parity between rat and human leads him to estab-
lish a corresponding social parity that is suspect. This may be emblematic of a problem-
atic feature of animal-inspired biosocial accounts of mental illness. That either the 
biological or the social phenomena correspond in some way does not necessarily entail 
that the other phenomena are similarly related.
There is, of course, an underlying question of whether the thinness of sociological con-
ceptualizations within some biosocial research really matters, and if so to whom. It seems 
obvious that sociologists would dislike such thinness and perceive it to be a crucial flaw, 
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while psychiatrists would see the issue as incidental. However, it is crucial to note that we 
do not just think this theory should be wholly discarded. Rather, we would argue that the 
scholarship on social defeat can be a productive centre for imagining human biosociality in 
different ways. This is, paradoxically, because of social defeat’s relative ‘thinness’ in terms 
of its sociological imagining of the world. In response to this consideration, we return to 
those appeals to ‘revitalize’ the relations between sociology and psychiatry noted in the 
introduction to this article (Fitzgerald et al., 2016). To this end, Callard and Fitzgerald 
(2015, p. 48) note that ‘the developmental, and indeed ontological, inseparability of bio-
logical and social life underwrites many of the most compelling ways in which social sci-
entists . . . and neuroscientists have learnt to labour together’. As the biosocial offers new 
potential for incorporating the social into traditionally biology-focused work, the concepts 
of the social that social scientists encounter in these projects are likely to be somewhat 
underwhelming. Rather than despairing, sociologists should seize the opportunity to con-
tribute to richer understandings of the biosocial entanglements of human life. It is in this 
spirit that the Mead–Selten comparison is an example of ‘livelier ways of working and 
thinking’ the social in the biosocial (Callard & Fitzgerald, 2015, p. 56).
Finally, while our primary aim is to provide a specific example of how sociology can 
contribute to the development and improvement of biosocial research, we are also keen 
to emphasize that sociology can itself be much improved through such engagement. 
Resident–intruder experiments have revealed substantial molecular similarities between 
rats and humans in terms of stress responses to certain interactions. Mead’s symbolic 
interaction emphasizes the physiological uniqueness (and seeming superiority) of 
humans, to an extent that seems questionable in light of biosocial research. This perhaps 
exemplifies Timmermans and Haas’s (2008) critique of a sociology with insufficient 
biology. From this position, Mead progresses to propose a corresponding social unique-
ness, and in doing so undermines the prospects for an animal-embracing biosocial sociol-
ogy. Given its organic behaviourist flavours, Meadian interactionism could potentially 
generate more sophisticated physiological hypotheses through engagement with animal 
similarities.
Conclusion
In this article, we have sought to critically reflect on the application of social defeat to 
human psychoses. We have argued that, because of an attempt to reconcile animal and 
human sociality, Selten promotes a problematic imagining of human sociality as hostile 
and pathological. To explore this problem, we have used Mead’s account of symbolic 
interaction in Mind, Self and Society as a means of comparative analysis. Beginning with 
intriguing similarities – the extrapolation of observations of fighting animals to theorize 
the biosocial genesis of human mental states – we have used Mead to critically analyse 
social defeat and to suggest potential remedies and future directions for improving 
understandings. We have pursued our concern that by moving from fighting rats to inter-
acting people, Selten over-emphasizes similarities and as a result offers a limited and 
pessimistic portrayal of human sociality. Within this imagining of society, minority 
groups are especially denigrated and hence pathologized, in a manner that seems incom-
patible with the diverse experiences and identities of real people.
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Mead provides a counterpoint to this emphasizing of similarities because, while 
similarly using observations of fighting animals to ground a theory of human conduct, 
he does so through an exploration of the dissimilarities between fighting animals and 
human sociality. This sociological account is ‘thin’ in a manner resembling social 
defeat, albeit in the opposite direction, being devoid of structural concerns and largely 
ignoring the potential for conflict in human societies. Though flawed, Mead’s approach 
reveals potential routes around problems with contemporary applications of social 
defeat to human psychoses through engaging with dissimilarities and variable pro-
cesses, rather than downplaying them. As contemporary mental health research rejects 
biological determinism and moves toward relations between sociology and psychiatry 
reminiscent of the early 20th century, it is only natural that we should seek to learn from 
that period of scholarship. In this respect, despite its noted flaws, interactionism has 
much to offer, and to learn from, contemporary social defeat research.
At a broader level, the comparison raises interesting questions for sociologists look-
ing toward the biosocial. The exploration of human social experiences through the lens 
of fighting animals specifically is an intriguing epistemic practice. Is something about 
conflict specifically indicative of human life? Is something about conflictual relation-
ships more generalizable than is the case for harmonious relationships? Could it be that 
conflict is more immediately tangible and therefore conducive to empirical interroga-
tion? Or is it that the abrasiveness of conflict imposes it more prominently on the minds 
of scholars than more mundane forms of interaction? In posing these questions, the anal-
ysis of social defeat through Mead reignites traditional sociological tensions between 
conflict and functionalist approaches to society. The ultimate challenge presented here is 
to explore human experience in ways that avoid totalizing characterizations of those 
experiences. It is perhaps in this manner that Selten and Mead can be best brought into 
fruitful dialogue.
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Notes
1. Size is used to ensure differentiated responses from two individuals. Similarly, Mead (1934, 
p. 49) noted: ‘Where the big dog attacks the little dog, the little dog puts his tail between his 
legs and runs away.’
2. Another contributing factor to this thinness is Mead’s predilection for an organic behaviour-
ism, albeit redefined as a ‘social behaviourism’ due to the inclusion of matters of hypoth-
esized psychology, mind and self that were at odds with traditional behaviourist tenets (Cook, 
1977).
Fletcher and Birk 1287
References
Albeck, D. S., McKittrick, C. R., Blanchard, D. C., Blanchard, R. J., Nikulina, J., McEwen, B. S., 
& Sakai, R. R. (1997). Chronic social stress alters levels of corticotropin-releasing factor and 
arginine vasopressin mRNA in rat brain. Journal of Neuroscience, 17(12), 4895–4903.
Alcock, J. (2001). The triumph of sociobiology. Oxford University Press.
Allen, J., Balfour, R., Bell, R., & Marmot, M. (2014). Social determinants of mental health. 
International Review of Psychiatry, 26(4), 392–407.
Alleva, E., & Aloe, L. (1989). Physiological roles of nerve growth factor in adult rodents: A 
biobehavioral perspective. International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 2(4), 213–230.
Barad, K. (2014). Diffracting diffraction: Cutting together-apart. Parallax, 20(3), 168–187.
Björkqvist, K. (2001). Social defeat as a stressor in humans. Physiology & Behavior, 73(3), 435–
442.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge University Press.
Brown, D. E. (1991). Human universals. Temple University Press.
Callard, F., & Fitzgerald, D. (2015). Rethinking interdisciplinarity across the social sciences and 
neurosciences. Palgrave Macmillan.
Cantor-Graae, E., & Selten, J. P. (2005). Schizophrenia and migration: A meta-analysis and 
review. American Journal of Psychiatry, 162(1), 12–24.
Charlesworth, S. J., Gilfillan, P., & Wilkinson, R. (2004). Living inferiority. British Medical 
Bulletin, 69(1), 49–60.
Cook, G. A. (1977). G. H. Mead’s Social Behaviorism. Journal of the History of the Behavioral 
Sciences, 13(4), 307–316.
Faris, R. E. L., & Dunham, H. W. (1939). Mental disorders in urban areas: An ecological study of 
schizophrenia and other psychoses. University of Chicago Press.
Fitzgerald, D., Rose, N., & Singh, I. (2016). Revitalizing sociology: Urban life and mental illness 
between history and the present. The British Journal of Sociology, 67(1), 138–160.
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. Basic Books.
Gevonden, M., Booij, J., van den Brink, W., Heijtel, D., van Os, J., & Selten, J. P. (2014a). Increased 
release of dopamine in the striata of young adults with hearing impairment and its relevance 
for the social defeat hypothesis of schizophrenia. JAMA Psychiatry, 71, 1364–1372.
Gevonden, M., Myin-Germeys, I., Wichers, M., Booij, J., van den Brink, W., van Winkel, R., & 
Selten, J. P. (2016). Reactivity to social stress in ethnic minority men. Psychiatry Research, 
246, 629–636.
Gevonden, M. J., Selten, J. P., Myin-Germeys, I., De Graaf, R., Ten Have, M., Van Dorsselaer, 
S., Van Os, J., & Veling, W. (2014b). Sexual minority status and psychotic symptoms: 
Findings from the Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Studies (NEMESIS). 
Psychological Medicine, 44(2), 421–433.
Gilbert, P., & Allan, S. (1998). The role of defeat and entrapment (arrested flight) in depression: 
An exploration of an evolutionary view. Psychological Medicine, 28(3), 585–598.
Haraway, D. J. (2008). When species meet. University of Minnesota Press.
Irvine, L. (2003). George’s bulldog: What Mead’s canine companion could have told him about 
the self. Sociological Origins, 3(1), 46–49.
Kirksey, S. E., & Helmreich, S. (2010). The emergence of multispecies ethnography. Cultural 
Anthropology, 25(4), 545–576.
Koolhaas, J. M., Coppens, C. M., de Boer, S. F., Buwalda, B., Meerlo, P., & Timmermans, P. 
J. (2013). The resident–intruder paradigm: A standardized test for aggression, violence and 
social stress. JoVE, 77(e4367). doi:10.3791/4367
1288 The Sociological Review 68(6)
Koolhaas, J. M., Meerlo, P., De Boer, S. F., Strubbe, J. H., & Bohus, B. (1995). Social stress in 
rats: An animal model of depression? Acta Neuropsychiatrica, 7(2), 27–29.
Landecker, H., & Panofsky, A. (2013). From social structure to gene regulation, and back: A criti-
cal introduction to environmental epigenetics for sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 39, 
333–357.
Latour, B. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern. 
Critical Inquiry, 30(2), 225–248.
Lederbogen, F., Kirsch, P., Haddad, L., Streit, F., Tost, H., Schuch, P., Wüst, S., Pruessner, J. C., 
Rietschel, M., Deuschle, M., & Meyer-Lindenberg, A. (2011). City living and urban upbring-
ing affect neural social stress processing in humans. Nature, 474(7352), 498–501.
Manning, N. (2019). Sociology, biology and mechanisms in urban mental health. Social Theory 
& Health, 17(1), 1–22.
Marrow, J., & Luhrmann, T. M. (2016). Conclusion. In T. M. Luhrmann & J. Marrow (Eds.), 
Our most troubling madness: Case studies in schizophrenia across cultures (pp. 197–222). 
University of California Press.
McGrath, J., Saha, S., Chant, D., & Welham, J. (2008). Schizophrenia: A concise overview of 
incidence, prevalence, and mortality. Epidemiologic Reviews, 30(1), 67–76.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self and society. The University of Chicago Press.
Meloni, M., & Testa, G. (2014). Scrutinizing the epigenetics revolution. BioSocieties, 9(4), 431–
456.
Meloni, M., Williams, S., & Martin, P. (2016). The biosocial: Sociological themes and issues. The 
Sociological Review Monographs, 64(1), 7–25.
Nelson, N. (2018). Model behavior: Animal experiments, complexity, and the genetics of psychiat-
ric disorders. The University of Chicago Press.
Newton, T. (2016). The turn to biology. The Sociological Review, 64(1), 117–133.
Niewöhner, J. (2011). Epigenetics: Embedded bodies and the molecularisation of biography and 
milieu. BioSocieties, 6(3), 279–298.
Niewöhner, J., & Lock, M. (2018). Situating local biologies: Anthropological perspectives on 
environment/human entanglements. BioSocieties, 13(4), 681–697.
Ramsden, E. (2009). The urban animal: Population density and social pathology in rodents and 
humans. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 87(2), 82.
Ramsden, E. (2012). Rats, stress and the built environment. History of the Human Sciences, 25(5), 
123–147.
Rose, N. (2013). The human sciences in a biological age. Theory, Culture & Society, 30(1), 3–34.
Rose, N., & Abi-Rached, J. (2013). Neuro: The new brain sciences and the management of the 
mind. Princeton University Press.
Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have 
failed. Yale University Press.
Selten, J. P., Booij, J., Buwalda, B., & Meyer-Lindenberg, A. (2017). Biological mechanisms 
whereby social exclusion may contribute to the etiology of psychosis: A narrative review. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 43(2), 287–292.
Selten, J. P., & Cantor-Graae, E. (2004). Schizophrenia and migration. In W. F. Gattaz & H. 
Häfner (Eds.), Search for the causes of schizophrenia (pp. 3–25). Springer/Steinkopf Verlag.
Selten, J. P., & Cantor-Graae, E. (2005). Social defeat: Risk factor for schizophrenia? The British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 187(2), 101–102.
Selten, J. P., van der Ven, E., Rutten, B. P., & Cantor-Graae, E. (2013). The social defeat hypoth-
esis of schizophrenia: An update. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 39(6), 1180–1186.
Fletcher and Birk 1289
Selten, J. P., van der Ven, E., & Termorshuizen, F. (2019). Migration and psychosis: A meta-anal-
ysis of incidence studies. Psychological Medicine. Advance online publication. doi:10.1017/
S0033291719000035
Selten, J. P., van Os, J., & Cantor-Graae, E. (2016). The social defeat hypothesis of schizophrenia: 
Issues of measurement and reverse causality. World Psychiatry, 15(3), 294–295.
Stefanski, V., & Engler, H. (1999). Social stress, dominance and blood cellular immunity. Journal 
of Neuroimmunology, 94(1–2), 144–152.
Tidey, J. W., & Miczek, K. A. (1997). Acquisition of cocaine self-administration after social 
stress: Role of accumbens dopamine. Psychopharmacology, 130(3), 203–212.
Timmermans, S., & Haas, S. (2008). Towards a sociology of disease. Sociology of Health & 
Illness, 30(5), 659–676.
van Dam, D. S., van der Ven, E., Velthorst, E., Selten, J. P., Morgan, C., & de Haan, L. (2012). 
Childhood bullying and the association with psychosis in non-clinical and clinical samples: A 
review and meta-analysis. Psychological Medicine, 42(12), 2463–2474.
van Os, J., Kenis, G., & Rutten, B. P. (2010). The environment and schizophrenia. Nature, 
468(7321), 203–212.
Veling, W., Selten, J. P., Susser, E., Laan, W., Mackenbach, J. P., & Hoek, H. W. (2007). 
Discrimination and the incidence of psychotic disorders among ethnic minorities in The 
Netherlands. International Journal of Epidemiology, 36(4), 761–768.
Wicks, S., Hjern, A., Gunnell, D., Lewis, G., & Dalman, C. (2005). Social adversity in child-
hood and the risk of developing psychosis: A national cohort study. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 162(9), 1652–1657.
